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Abstract
Cognitive architectures are frequently built to model naturally intelligent behavior. This aims
on two primary goals: On one hand these architectures model human behavior in order to give a
better understanding of the human thought process. On the other hand cognitive architectures
are an approach of modeling artiﬁcial intelligence. Those two goals might be conﬂicting, as
humans sometimes act irrationally e.g. because they were cognitively biased. In this work, we
analyze on a theoretical level whether cognitive architectures are also biased. Therefore we ﬁrst
abstract more general behavior from cognitive fallacies. Then we evaluate for the architectures
Clarion, Leabra and Lida to what extent they can be biased.
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1 Introduction
Most cognitive architectures are built to model speciﬁc aspects of human cognition and there-
fore they are evaluated in those tasks they were created for: The Chrest architecture[1] aims on
modeling human perception. Therefore it successfully simulates humans eye movements, when
playing chess. In contrast, the cognitive architecture ’Adaptive Control of Thought Rational’
(ACT-R) [2] models the human thought process. It can for example simulate the processing
of cognitive arithmetic [3]. The BICA Society gives an overview showing 26 cognitive architec-
tures [4] with their diﬀerent goals and approaches. Comparing these architectures is diﬃcult, as
they process diﬀerent kinds of data in diﬀerent ways. Therefore questions like ’Which of them
model human cognition the best?’ cannot be clearly answered. In this work, we propose to
compare cognitive architectures, by a general measure, that can be applied even if architectures
are built to process diﬀerent kinds of inputs. The key to this measure is cognitive biases.
When solving tasks, humans do not always act rationally. They tend to rely on learned
heuristics and make systematic errors – known as cognitive biases, e.g.:
• When humans were asked to estimate their own skill, Kruger and Dunning [5] showed
that experts tend to underestimating, while unskilled individuals tend to overestimating.
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• When asked about the valuation on furniture, self-made products achieve higher values,
even if all the parts were bought [6]. This is known as IKEA eﬀect.
• People were asked two questions in a row, both on estimating a number. First, they had
to decide whether or not the estimated number was bigger than a given value. Then they
were asked for the exact value. The results showed, that the given value highly inﬂuenced
the exact estimation; the answered value was close to the anchoring value[7].
Many of these eﬀects are known, but they mostly apply only to a speciﬁc given task. Thus,
they can hardly be applied directly to evaluate cognitive architectures. This is why we generalize
them in order to make them applicable for a measurement of cognitive architectures.
Cognitive fallacies are often judged as weakness in humans behavior, as the actions are
considered irrational. In contrast to this opinion Gigerenzer [8] showed evidence that in real life
situations, with limited knowledge, human behavior often leads to better, more robust results,
than rationally acting algorithms. Following this argumentation, it is possible, that those very
processes which cause cognitive fallacies or biases also result in general intelligent behavior.
Given a natural cognitive system as inspiration for the construction of an artiﬁcial cognitive
architecture. When modeling, the focus can lie on the functionality or the structure of the orig-
inal. Functionality is important for the performance of the system, while the structure might
give hints on the internal processes, and possibly lead to better explanations[9].
Thus, this work investigates how structural diﬀerences can lead to functional diﬀerences. Fur-
ther it builds a theoretical basis for later empirical studies to compare cognitive architectures.
We analyze the internal processes of three exemplary cognitive architectures to predict whether
they can be biased. In the following section, we give more details on cognitive biases and gener-
alize the behavior in order to be able to measure the eﬀect in a cognitive architecture. Therefore
we summarize the eﬀects of cognitive biases abstractly. In Section 3 we describe three exem-
plary cognitive architectures: Clarion, Lida and Leabra. Their behavior with respect of the
abstracted features are explained in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, the results are summarized
and an outlook on future empirical evaluations is given.
2 Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are eﬀects indicating a systematic deviation from a rational judgment. In an
early work, Kahneman and Tversky [7] presented 13 diﬀerent cognitive biases. For example they
provided evidence that human’s natural way of decision making ignores prior probabilities. The
availability heuristic shows up when estimating probabilities of occurrences of events. Humans
tend to estimate the ease of retrievability, instead.
Participants were asked to decide for one of two mathematically identical alternatives –
one was described with mostly positive words, the other one used negative words[10]. People
signiﬁcantly preferred the positive formulation – the corresponding eﬀect is called framing eﬀect.
Another long known psychological eﬀect is the halo eﬀect. Few attributes of a person were
read to participants of a study. When the participants were later asked to characterize the
person, the result was highly inﬂuenced by the order of the given attributes [11].
Another study described the priming eﬀect : people ware asked to complete the letters
’so p’ such that an existing word is created. The result varied: When people had the context
of cleaning or washing in mind, the word they came up with was soap. When the context was
set to food, people answered soup[12, p. 72].
Abstracting from these examples, for a cognitive bias to be visible, we need a system with
three properties:
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1. The system has prior knowledge
2. The system has a current problem task to be solved
3. The system has had recent inputs before confronted with the current problem task
It is expected normal, that people with diﬀerent experiences or systems with other learning
examples, will diﬀer in their behavior. So in all our examples, we keep the prior knowledge
aspect ﬁxed and just vary in the recent inputs or in the current problem.
In the example of the priming eﬀect, the prior knowledge is the knowledge of words from
daily life. So in this case, it can be assumed that each participant knew several ﬁtting words.
The given problem task was to complete the given letters such that an existing word is created.
The recent inputs were given by setting the context to either food or cleaning. This builds the
ﬁrst characteristic to be measured for the cognitive architecture: The study showed, that the
result varies depending on recent inputs.
The example of the halo eﬀect showed that participants were inﬂuenced such that informa-
tion earlier given in the current problem, were taken as higher prioritized. So the task given
was to characterize a person, by its earlier given attributes. The problem description just varied
the order. So the second characteristic to be measured is: when given an ordered problem task,
the result varies, depending in the order of the problem.
For the framing eﬀect, the task was to choose between two alternatives. Prior knowledge is
that the participant understands and can valuate both alternatives. Then he is asked to choose
the preferred one. We do not consider any recent inputs, but just the variation in the given
problem task. For the given choices people chose that formulation, which used more positive
words. In order to measure this eﬀect, we abstract this to: the result varies, depending on the
problem formulation. Note that this eﬀect can be considered as issue of communication or of
internal representation – we focus on internal representation.
3 Cognitive Architectures
One purpose of cognitive architectures is to model general intelligence. Other than algorithms,
which are designed to solve a speciﬁc task, cognitive architectures should be able to present
solutions to a various ﬁeld of problems. Like humans, they should provide a solution, even if
they never encountered the problem before. This solution may be suboptimal, but should at
least be reasonable. In the following, three architectures are presented and shortly explained.
3.1 Clarion
CLARION means ’Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction ON-line’. It was
designed to explicitly diﬀer between an explicit and an implicit level and their interaction.
It consists of four systems: the Action-Centered Subsystem (ACS), the Non-Action-Centered
Subsystem (NACS), the Meta-Cognitive Subsystem (MCS) and the Motivational Subsystem
(MS). The Action-Centered Subsystem processes procedural knowledge, for example which ac-
tion to carry out in a given situation. The Non-Action-Centered Subsystem handles declarative
knowledge, such as facts, associations and memories. The Motivational Subsystem cares about
the basic needs and derives goals from them. It sends the goals to the ACS for processing. The
Meta-Cognitive Subsystem combines goals by reinforcement, observes the system and choose
between diﬀerent algorithms and parameters.
Each of these system consists out of an implicit and an explicit level. The explicit levels are
networks of chunks. Chunks are nodes, which represent a concept and can be connected. The
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implicit level is a neural network, which is learned with diﬀerent algorithms such as back-
propagation, Q-Learning and Top-Down-Assimilation. Corresponding levels are connected and
represent similar knowledge. The neurons of the implicit level serve as attributes of the chunks
of the explicit level. Because of the diﬀerent representation and processing of the information,
the results need to be combined [13, p. 11-13][14, p. 5-10].
Action-Centered Subsystem The chunks of the ACS represent concepts, which are com-
bined to rules. A rule consists of a condition and an action. If the condition ﬁts to the current
situation, the action is recommended. There are three kind of rules: Fixed Rules (FR), Rule-
Extraction-Reﬁnement rules (RER) and Independent Rule Learning Rules (IRL). While ﬁxed
rules model evolutionary reﬂexes and moral basics which cannot be changed, the others can be
generated, changed, generalized and specialized. For example two existing rules can be com-
bined based either on the base-level activation, the utility or the support. Base-level activation
expresses, how often the rule was used recently. Utility is the relation of the successful applying
of a rule and its costs. Support speciﬁes, how good the situation ﬁts to the condition. The
choice between these measures is up to the MCS[14, p. 24-44].
Non-Action-Centered Subsystem Chunks of the NACS represent facts, associations and
sets. In contrast to to processing in ACS, they are not combined to rules, but to associations.
Chunks can be activated in following ﬁve ways: They are a subset of an active chunk, due to
actions of the ACS, by an association, by their attributes of the implicit level or by similarity.
The strength of a single chunk is the sum of all these sources. When the NACS receives
a chunk or single attributes from the ACS it activates them and spreads activation in both
levels. The NACS also handles episodic memories by saving every action, calculation and
experience and combining them with the time of occurrence. Every chunk in this memory
has a decreasing activation, and is deleted when inactive for too long. Further NACS saves
frequency distributions about the situations, it executes actions and their reinforcement, to
improve further learning processes [14, p. 62-89].
ACS and NACS cooperate as follows: When ACS retrieves the information ’X’, it searches
for condition ’X’. If not present, it is surpassed to the NACS, where the superset of ’X’, ’Y’ is
found and returned. ACS then ﬁnds rules ’Y → Z’ and processes them [14, p. 84-86].
Motivational and Meta-Cognitive Subsystems The Motivational Subsystem derives
goals from primal existential needs (e.g. food and sleep) and psychological needs (e.g. soci-
ety and self awareness) as well as secondary needs. The Meta-Cognitive Subsystem models the
self-awareness, by regulating the calculations of clarion. It chooses algorithms and parameters
and decides which inputs are considered in order to optimize itself. Therefore it can cancel
processes and prioritizes goals to trace, by a majority vote of the diﬀerent needs for the goals.
To prevent inconsistent behavior, a potentially new goal is compared to the current goal. If the
diﬀerence is bigger than a speciﬁed threshold, the goal is updated. A further task of the MCS
is to generate reinforcement, which is deﬁned by the grade of fulﬁllment of needs. It weights
the implicit and explicit level to obtain diﬀerent outcomes. [14, p. 100-116]
3.2 LEABRA
LEABRA means ’Local Error-driven and Associative, Biologically Realistic Algorithm’ and is
based on an adapted layered neural network. Its main purpose is not to model cognition, but
to model learning more biologically plausible than normal neural networks and thus resigns
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some abstractions. It has an adjusted activation function and uses local mistakes for learning;
because of these interesting learning properties, we consider it, anyway. [15, p. 12].
Structure The neural network of Leabra is an auto-encoder with bidirectional and symmetric
weights. Since there is no back propagation in the biological archetype, leabra learns with local
errors. Therefore the principle of Boltzmann-Machines is used. In addition to the two learning
phases of Boltzmann-Machines, a third phase is used, which tries to reconstruct the input signal.
The diﬀerence between the original and reconstructed signal is used as an additional error. This
construction allows for both associative and error-driven learning[15, p. 11-14, 34,113-114].
ReBel ReBel means ’Relative Belief Framework’. It regulates of the overall activity of the
neural network by a soft-k-winner-takes-it-all-principle. This means, that only up to k neu-
rons in one layer of the neural network can be active simultaneously. This leads to a sparse
distributed representation, where one category is represented by only a few neurons and non-
overlapping categories. So the activation of a neuron depends not only on its parameters and
inputs, but also on the overall activity. These limitations assure that small changes of the input
lead to small changes in the calculations, which leads to robust behavior[15, p. 83-97].
GausSig The Sigmoid function models the gradual implication between two connected neu-
rons. It can be used for ﬁltering and covers large value spaces and thus is well generalizing. The
Gaussian function can compare the output of one neuron with the weights of the following. The
activation of a neuron depends on the similarity of the weights and the corresponding input
signals. This is why the Gaussian function deﬁnes the relationship of two neurons. It creates
a sparse and disjoint representation and is therefore better suited for the categorization and
specialization. Leabra combines Sigmoid and Gauss function to the GausSig function, covering
both properties, specialization and generalization [15, p. 101-107].
MaxIn Shorter training phases need smaller amounts of training samples, which increases
the risk of an unlucky sampling, such that the result is not representative for the rest of the
learning samples. To overcome this error, Leabra maximizes the quality of the input signal by
reducing the learning rate for input signals far away from the expected range [15, p. 108-112].
3.3 LIDA
LIDA is short for ’Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent’[16]. Its cognitive process is based
on iterative processing of cognitive cycles. This happens asynchronously in parallel such that
cycles can be overlapping, processing diﬀerent tasks and sharing their used memory. Several
kinds of memories are modeled explicitly, e.g. sensory memory, procedural memory, perceptual
associative memory[17]. In the latter, there are diﬀerent kinds of nodes, for example nodes
representing feelings for emotions.
Cycles mainly go through three diﬀerent phases: perception, attention adjustment and action
selection. The perception compounds several sensory stimuli to objects until the situation is
determined. The current situation is compared to memorized situations and similar situations
are loaded to the working memory. Since the working memory is limited, Lida permanently
focuses its attention and removes unimportant pieces.
To select an action, the procedural memory comes into account. It saves schema, consisting of
actions and their results. Each schema has a base activation, which determines how likely an
action provides the expected outcome, and an actual activation, that indicates the relevance of
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the schema in the actual context. The most ﬁtting action is handed to the motor memory.
At the end, the learning phase takes place. Perception learning saves new objects and categories,
episodic learning saves events and procedural learning saves new actions and their execution.
Cognitive Processes There are three diﬀerent kinds of processes: reactive, deliberative and
meta-cognitive processes. Reactive processes directly map an action to a situation. Deliberative
processes are decision processes, responsible for planning and problem solving. Meta-cognitive
processes reﬂect the own mind. Deliberative and meta-cognitive processes are represented by
several circuits, which are build up on another. The control is given by the fact, that a circuit
saves its results in the working memory, which can be accessed by the next circuit.
Emotions Goals are derived from emotions and thus are the motivation for calculations.
Emotions are represented with feeling nodes, which are unique and have a positive or negative
value. They are handled like all nodes and can for example be part of a situation or are loaded
into the working memory. In addition to the feeling itself, they also contain the reason for this
feeling.
4 Results
In the following, we check for each architecture respectively if their output varies when: 1)
recent information to the system is diﬀerent 2) the order in the problem task in changed 3)
the representation of the problem task is changed.
Clarion 1) Clarion can ’remember’ diﬀerent recent inputs by the base-level activation of
chunks. After receiving an input, the corresponding chunks are activated and the activation
is propagated increasing their base-level activation. This expresses, how often a rule or chunk
was used recently. The higher the activation, the more likely its selection becomes. If diﬀerent
recent inputs were shown, diﬀerent chunks would vary in their base-level activation, resulting
in the choice of diﬀerent rules or chunks as output.
2) To process the order of the problem task, the architecture needs to be able to consider early
parts of the problem task diﬀerently to later ones. As there is no such mechanism present in
clarion, it cannot be biased, this way.
3) In clarion there are several ways to achieve diﬀerent representations for the same problem.
First, both layers – chunk network and neural network – represent the situation in diﬀerent
ways. Not only because the storing of information diﬀers, but also, because the neural network
is more speciﬁc than the chunk network. The neurons deﬁne the chunks in the upper layer.
But a chunk can be active, if only a subset of its neurons are active, while a neuron can be
active, without activating a chunk. The general meaning of the situation is the same, but it
is represented diﬀerently in the layers. Besides this separation into layers, the representation
of one problem might be diﬀerent dependent on the time. The Meta-cognitive Subsystem can
ﬁlter the input with its ﬁltering option, can set weights to zero and can permit information to
ﬂow. It can control the representation of a situation in the system, which might diﬀer from
time to time. So one situation can be represented diﬀerently in the system, resulting in diﬀerent
activation ﬂows and thus diﬀerent outcomes.
Leabra For Leabra part 1) is already shown [15, p. 199-201].
2) Leabra can produce diﬀerent outputs depending on the order of the inputs in several ways:
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It can weight earlier inputs higher or even dismiss later ones. Leabra might produce this
behavior due to categorization and the characteristics of its neural network. The categorization
is produced by two mechanisms: First, through a sparse representation generated by ReBel. It
regulates the overall activity resulting in only a few active neurons at a time. Second, the cluster
forming Gauss part of the GausSig function, results in an information loss and a generalization.
The cluster centers are initialized by the ﬁrst inputs, while later inputs can inﬂuence them to a
smaller degree, depending on the decay of the learning rate. Therefore, later inputs are either
pressed into the ﬁrst formed categories or handled as outliers and thus are not considered.
3) The third possible bias considers diﬀerent representations, which is not present in Leabra. It
would need diﬀerent representations of information, which is not given due to the single neural
network. A ﬁltering, which could achieve this goal is not present, either.
Lida 1) Lida’s circles share the same memory. Therefore recent information are present, when
a problem task occurs. So the circles, processing the problem, compete with other circles for
active memories. This can lead to diﬀerent results, when the recent inputs diﬀer.
2) Lida’s reaction on diﬀerent orders of inputs depends on the fact if the task is presented such
that one single circle starts processing it, or not. When this is the case the order does not play
a role as every part of it gets the same attention. When many successive circles are processing
it, the order plays an important role: those ﬁrst circles would change the early memory states,
such that later parts of the problem statement are processed diﬀerently. So dependent on the
time needed to present the task, we expect this eﬀect to occur or not.
3) Lida is not created to build separate representations for the same problem. As for Leabra,
there is no ﬁltering present, which might generate this feature.
These results are summarized in Table 1. For each cognitive architecture, it is shown whether
or not the presented variation can cause a change in the result.
Clarion Leabra Lida
diﬀerent recent inputs   
diﬀerent order of inputs   / 
diﬀerent representation   
Table 1: Overview of the properties of the architectures
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we have investigated how three structurally diﬀerent cognitive architectures pro-
cess information and to what extent this leads to functional changes in their output, namely
to cognitive biases. Therefore, we have abstracted three characteristics, which cognitive archi-
tectures should show, to be able to be biased just as humans. The results should depend on
1) recent inputs, even if they are independent of the current problem 2) the order of the given
problem task 3) the representation of the given problem task.
We have evaluated the three exemplary cognitive architectures Clarion, Leabra and Lida with
respect to these characteristics. All architectures are inﬂuenced by recent inputs and could re-
turn diﬀerent results. Clarion cannot distinguish the situations, when the problem task is given
in a diﬀerent order. Leabra weighs earlier inputs more and can therefore get diﬀerent results,
here. For Lida it depends: if the task is given during one cycle, then it cannot create diﬀerent
solutions, otherwise this is possible. The representation of the problem can inﬂuence Clarion,
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because of the ﬁltering possibility of the metacognitive system. The combination of chunk net-
work and neural network can also generate diﬀerent representations respectively. Leabra and
Lida lack the ﬁltering mechanisms to do so.
In future work more cognitive architectures could be evaluated in order to make them
comparable as well. Further, practical evaluations with these architectures can be performed
to verify to what extend the expected eﬀects actually occur. Therefore as ﬁrst step test data
sets with the corresponding attributes need to be generated. For a given architecture and
characteristic two sets of test data are created, e.g. only varying the representation of the
problem. They are then independently given to two identical cognitive architectures and the
results are compared. Thus, the current theoretical measure will become a practical metric for
measuring cognitive architectures ability to be biased.
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